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Abstract
Organizations’ growing exposure to IT operational risk, or the risk of failures of operational IT systems, could
translate into significant losses. Despite this, there are notable theoretical and empirical gaps in the literature on
IT operational risk. We propose the “resource weaknesses” framework, which extends the resource-based
theory of the firm, as a theoretical lens for investigating IT operational risk and its impacts. We also theorize
about and empirically examine the impact differences of two categories of IT operational failures: ones
resulting in the disclosure, misuse, or destruction of data assets, and ones resulting in the loss of availability or the
mis-operation of functional IT assets responsible for the handling of data assets. Whereas the former, datarelated failures have had some coverage in the literature, little is known about the latter, function-related
failures. We apply an event study analysis with a well-balanced data set of IT operational failure events that
occurred in U.S. financial service firms over a 25-year period. We find that function-related events have a
substantially larger negative wealth effect than data-related events, and that firm characteristics such as firm
size and growth potential greatly influence the degree of wealth effect. We conclude with important
implications for practice and research.
Keywords: IT Risk, Operational Risk, IT Security, Event Study.
* Robert Fichman was the accepting senior editor. This article was submitted on 29th June 2010 and went
through two revisions.
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IT Operational Risk and its Subcategories
1. Introduction
As information technology (IT) systems are increasingly embedded in business processes, failures of
these systems are exposing organizations to significant economic losses. The following are examples
of such failures:
1. In August 2008, HSBC Bank suffered a failure of its core banking computer system due
to a corrupted disk in its Amherst data center, resulting in four million customers
experiencing a significant interruption in services for nearly a week.
2. In June 2005, more than 40 million credit card accounts at MasterCard International
were compromised due to a computer security breach.
3. United Airlines suffered a shutdown of a mission-critical system in 2007 that caused
the cancellation of more than 20 flights and the delay of 250, resulting in an overall
loss exceeding $10 million.
4. EBay’s servers crashed in 1999, costing the company $2 million a day in losses.
The above failures are manifestations of what we term IT operational risk. The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (BCBS) defines operational risk as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or
failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external events” (BCBS, 2001, p. 2). While
given for use by financial firms, this definition is equally applicable to non-financial firms. IT
operational risk is a specialized subset of operational risk and centers around potential failures in
operational IT systems and/or business processes that they support.
The main objective of this paper is to theoretically investigate and empirically examine the impact
differences of two broad classes of IT operational risk events. The distinction we make between the
two classes is motivated primarily by the fact that extant research has focused on one class while
being virtually silent on the other. We characterize these classes here and will define them formally
later. At the core of our distinction is the recognition that an IT system comprises functional IT assets
(hardware, software, telecommunications, end-users, system operators, and system management
procedures), which are responsible for creating, processing, transporting, and storing data assets.
For the purpose of this study, we respectively distinguish between the following two classes of IT
operational risk events.
Class 1: IT operational risk events that result in disclosure of confidential data assets to
unauthorized parties, misuse of data assets, or destruction of data assets.
Class 2: IT operational risk events that result in loss of availability, or are the result of the
mis-operation, of functional IT assets responsible for the handling of data
assets.
These characterizations recognize that data has no intrinsic functional or operational capability and
that data is only indirectly affected by class 2 events. Also, class 1 events may occur even if
functional IT assets operate properly, and class 2 events may or may not impact data assets. In this
light, for lack of better terms, we will refer loosely to IT operational risk events in classes 1 and 2 as
Data and Function events, respectively.
Extant research on IT operational risk has two critical shortcomings that are of interest to this study.
First, extant studies lack adequate theoretical grounding. The hypotheses they test rest mostly on
anecdotal evidence, surveys of IT managers, and past empirical results. A suitable theoretical
framework is crucial to the ability to theorize about IT operational risk and to conduct meaningful
empirical research. Second, extant work is unbalanced in its treatment of Data-related and Functionrelated risks. It has concentrated on Data events, primarily ones due to malware and hacking attacks,
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and yielded mixed results on the impact of these events (e.g., Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou,
2003; Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004; Acquisti, Friedman, & Telang, 2006; Kannan, Rees,
& Sridhar, 2007). Even work that has paid attention to Function events has used small data sets and
focused on denial-of-service (DOS) and virus attacks that compromise the availability of IT assets
(e.g., Campbell et al., 2003; Hovav & D’Arcy, 2003; Cavusoglu et al., 2004). Thus, completely
overlooked are incidents where functional IT assets mis-operate due to such common factors as
software bugs, network failures, user input errors, and operator errors.
In this light, the goal of this paper is two-fold. First, we propose the resource weaknesses framework
(West & DeCastro, 2001; Arend, 2004) as a theoretical lens for reasoning about IT operational risk
and its subtypes. This framework extends the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt,
1984) by recognizing that firms often develop organizational weaknesses in conjunction with the
development of resource strengths that lead to competitive advantage. Although the IT literature has
dealt with strategic advantages arising from IT resources (e.g., Bharadwaj, 2000; Wade & Hulland,
2004), it has not explicitly addressed capability weaknesses arising from these same resources. Such
weaknesses manifest as IT operational risk events. Our second goal is to theorize about and
empirically test the impact of Data and Function events on the market value of firms experiencing
them. To achieve this purpose, we use the event study methodology with data from a commercial
proprietary database called Financial Institutions Risk Scenarios Trends (FIRST). FIRST is a
comprehensive repository of thousands of publicly reported operational risk events occurring
worldwide, with a strong representation of events in financial services firms. Our primary focus is,
therefore, on the financial services industry. This industry is sufficiently large in its own right for our
results to be of value to a wide audience. Nonetheless, since the financial services industry is so
heavily reliant on IT (Berger, 2003), we expect our findings to apply to other IT-intensive industries.
This paper makes two important contributions to the IT risk literature. It is the first to propose a
theoretical lens for conceptualizing IT operational risk, where the predictions we make based on this
theoretical lens concerning the impacts of various subtypes of this risk are validated by our empirical
results. Moreover, by using the most varied data sample to date, the paper’s results offer novel insights
into a little-explored but important class of IT risk. Like past research on operational risk, in general
(Cummins, Lewis, & Wei, 2006), we find that IT operational risk as a whole has a negative wealth effect.
More importantly, we observe that only Function events result in a statistically significant drop in firm
market value, and that the drop is substantially larger than that observed for all events combined and for
Data events, in particular. Last, we find that the firm characteristics of size, growth potential, and
financial subsector impact the degree of market reaction to IT operational risk events. These findings
have important implications for practice and research, as our discussion will show.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 formally defines IT operational risk and reviews related
literature. Section 3 presents the theory of resource weaknesses and formulates our research
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and methodology used to test the hypotheses and presents
the results. Section 5 discusses our main findings, their limitations, and their implications for research
and practice along with directions for future research. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.

2. Background and Literature Review
This section discusses the notion of operational risk in general, defines IT operational risk and two of
its subtypes, and reviews the extant literature on IT operational risk.

2.1. Operational Risk and IT Operational Risk
The increased interest in (general) operational risk in recent years is attributed to new regulatory
capital and compliance requirements for financial institutions, which came as a counter-measure to
numerous high-visibility operational risk events. By one estimate, about 40 percent of all firms that
experience high magnitude operational risk events are out of business within three to five years
(Croy, 2008). However, even more common, non-catastrophic operational risk events are of
significant concern. For example, a study of operational risk in banking found that “large,
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internationally active banks typically experience between 50 and 80 losses, each exceeding $1 million
per year” (Rosenberg & Schuermann, 2006, p. 591). Overall, there is a clear recognition that
operational risk events can have severe impacts “on earnings, share price volatility, and potentially
even solvency” (Cummins et al., 2006, p. 2606).
Under recently imposed regulatory standards, financial institutions, primarily depository institutions,
are required to track their operational risk exposure within seven risk categories as defined by the
Basel Committee (BCBS, 2001). These categories are defined in Table 1.
Table 1. BCBS Operational Risk Categories
Basel Operational Risk Category
Internal Fraud: acts to defraud,
misappropriate property, or
circumvent regulations, the law, or
company policy, by employees
External Fraud: acts to defraud,
misappropriate property, or
circumvent the law, by external
parties

Illustrative IT Operational Risk Events
(from the FIRST database)
Employee sold proprietary information, which
was used to make counterfeit checks
Rogue trader exploited loophole in IT system to
hide trading losses

Primary IT assets
Affected
(Data or Functional)
Data
Functional

Computer hackers obtained personal data on
thousands of customers

Data

Computer worm attacked phone, Internet, and
banking networks, leading to a breakdown in
services

Functional

Employment Practices and
Workplace Safety: acts
Employees took valuable client information prior
inconsistent with employment,
to taking a position at a rival firm
health or safety laws, or agreements

Data

Clients, Products, and Business
Practices: failures to meet a
professional obligation to specific
clients or from the nature or design
of a product

Trading brokerage violated regulatory trading
rules due to faulty system

Functional

Bank failed to implement systems compliant
with regulatory anti-money laundering
provisions

Functional

Damage to Physical Assets: loss
or damage to physical assets from
natural disasters or other events

Burst steam pipe shut down building cooling
system, leading to the inability to use computer
systems

Functional

Business Disruption and System
Failure: disruption of business or
system failure

A “keystroke error” lists a multi-million share IPO
on Nasdaq for $0.01 per share rather than the
original price of $19.50 per share
Website failure led to inability of customers to
conduct online trading

Company fined by regulatory agency for failing
Execution, Delivery, and Process to comply with data retention policies
Management: failures in transaction Computer system incorrectly reported
processing or process management transactions due to a software bug (leading to
regulatory penalties)

Data
Functional
Data
Functional

While IT operational risk is only a specialized subset of operational risk, it cuts across all seven
Basel-defined categories. This is consistent with the IT Governance Institute view (ITGI, 2007a)
and supported in Table 1 using examples of IT operational risk events (second column) extracted
from the FIRST database that we used to construct our data sample. Such extensive representation
of IT risk events across the spectrum of operational risk in financial institutions does not come as a
surprise, considering that financial services have ranked within the top 10 most IT intensive
industries in the U.S. since the mid-1990s (Triplett & Bosworth, 2002).
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2.2. IT Operational Risk Defined
Straub and Welke (1998) define “systems risk” as uncertainty related to using computer-based
systems and interpret this risk to be “broadly construed to mean modification, destruction, theft, or
lack of availability of computer assets such as hardware, software, data, and services” (p. 442).
This interpretation is consistent with Loch, Carr, and Warkentin’s (1992) earlier recognition that IT
operational risk could result in the disclosure, modification, destruction, or denial of use of IT
resources. It also coincides with the Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA) framework commonly
used to benchmark the security of an organization’s data and information assets in terms of risks
surrounding the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of these assets (Campbell et al., 2003;
Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Kannan et al., 2007). Together, these three views offer a solid basis for our
next definition of IT operational risk; although we need to further clarify that computer assets, or
what we call IT assets, include hardware, software, telecommunication, data, users, system
operators, IT management procedures, and IT infrastructure services (Weill & Broadbent, 1998).
Accordingly, we offer the following adaptation of Straub and Welke’s (1998) definition:
IT operational risk is any threat that may lead to the improper modification,
destruction, theft, or lack of availability of IT assets.
We distinguish between two types of IT operational risk events -- Data and Function events -based on the primary IT assets being affected. (Table 1 characterizes the samples of IT operational
risk events accordingly.) This distinction recognizes that data assets have no intrinsic function, as
even the meaning of data comes about from the context in which the data is used. All other IT
assets provide the functions needed to handle – create, process, transport, and store – data assets
(Longo, 2009), and can, hence, be termed functional IT assets. Another notion at the core of this
distinction is that IT operational risk events may directly impact either data assets or functional IT
assets.
Data events directly impact data assets. They may be due to malware or hacker attacks (phishing,
Trojans, viruses, and worms) or computer crime activities by internal personnel. They can result in
the extraction of private sensitive data, the deletion of data files, theft of passwords and access
codes, or website defacement. Data events may also be due to accidental factors, such as loss of
computer equipment containing confidential data, unintentional posting of sensitive data on a firm’s
website, or erroneous mailing of sensitive customer information to the wrong parties.
Data-related IT operational risk is any threat to the confidentiality of data assets that
can result in the disclosure, misuse, or destruction of these assets.
Function events directly impact functional non-data IT assets by affecting either their integrity (i.e.,
correct operation) or availability (Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Kannan et al., 2007). Events that result in
loss of availability of functional IT assets can be due to technical problems (e.g., hardware,
software, network, or power outages), natural phenomena (e.g., floods), malicious activities (e.g.,
DOS attacks or vandalism), or human errors. Events that compromise the integrity of functional IT
assets can be due to viruses that delete programs, software bugs and processing errors, or user
input errors. Like Data events, Function events can be malicious and externally initiated, but they
are more often accidental and originate from within the firm.
Function-related IT operational risk is any threat to the availability or to the integrity
of functional IT assets (that may eventually affect data assets).

2.3. Research on IT Operational Risk
The IT risk literature has recognized the importance of IT operational risk but only to a limited extent.
A comprehensive survey confirms that the primary focus of this literature is on risks arising in the
development of IT systems (Sherer & Alter, 2004). Some work recognizes that IT development risk
and IT operational risk interact and highlights the need to integrate their treatment (e.g., Lyytinen &
Hirschheim, 1987; Markus & Keil, 1994; Markus, 2000). In this vein, researchers have called on

Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 12 Issue 9 pp.606-631 September 2011

610

Goldstein et al. / Economic Impact of IT Operational Risk

system developers to consider how system design and development practices affect the potential for
human operator errors (Brown & Patterson, 2001), maintenance errors (Charette, Adams, & White,
1997), and computer crimes (Baskerville, 1993).
There is much work on IT operational risk in the context of information security, but this work largely
concentrates on Data-related risks. Straub and Welke (1998) explain that information security is a
subset of what they call “systems” risk, as it is concerned only with the protection of data and
information assets (Smith, 1989; Ryan & Bordoloi, 1997). In fact, according to a review of more than
1,280 information security research papers published from 1990 to 2004 (Willison & Siponen, 2007), the
bulk of these papers address the nature and prevention of data privacy violations and other Data-related
threats (e.g., viruses and hacker attacks), and far fewer specifically address Function-related threats.
Relatively few empirical studies have addressed IT operational risk. These studies analyze the impact
of IT operational risk events on firm value using the event study methodology, except for Ko and
Dorantes (2006), who use a matched-sample comparative analysis. Table 2 provides details on these
1
studies, the types of events (Data and Function) they analyzed, and their main findings.
Table 2. Summary of Extant Empirical Studies
Study
Campbell,
et al.
(2003)

Sample
Period

Num. Num. of Events and Risk Event Target Basis for
Data-Function Classifications
of
Tested
Events
Hypotheses
Data
Function
x 11 data
security
Breaches
x 4 website
defacing
attacks
x 4 viruses

19952000

43

Hovav and 1998D’Arcy
2002
(2003)

23

Cavusoglu 1996, et al.
2001
(2004)

66

x 32 data
security
breaches

Acquisti,
et al.
(2006)

79

x 67 data
security
breaches
x 12 data loss

20002005

Key Relevant Findings
and Observations

x 8 DOS attacks
x 2 service
interruptions
x 2 traffic re-direction
x 2 flaws in email
systems
x 10 worms (selfpropagating email
attachments that
overwhelm email
servers)

x Anecdotal x Negative market reaction
Evidence
found only for breaches
x Academic / involving confidential data
Practitioner x All Function events and
Surveys
only about half of Data
events involved nonconfidential data

x 23 DOS attacks

x Anecdotal
Evidence

x 34 DOS attacks

x Resource- x Negative market reactions
Based
found for both Data and
Theory
Function events, without
x Information differences between types
of attack
Transfer
Theory
x Stronger market reaction
observed for Internet and
x Anecdotal
small firms
Evidence
x Market reaction increases
over time
x Other
Empirical
Studies of
Security
Breaches

x No negative market
reaction to DOS attacks is
observed, except for
Internet companies

x Negative market reaction
observed for Data events,
with a stronger reaction for
retail firms and for smaller
firms

1

We exclude Bharadwaj, Keil, and Mahring (2009). This study explored the impact of IT development failures and operational IT
failures without clarifying the nature of the operational IT failures their data covered.
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Table 2. Summary of Extant Empirical Studies (continued)
Sample
Period

Study

Num. Num. of Events and Risk Event Target Basis for
Data-Function Classifications
Tested
of
Hypotheses
Events
Data
Study

Key Relevant Findings
and Observations

19972003

19

x 12 security
breaches of
confidential data
x 7 other security
breaches

Kannan, et 1997al. (2007)
2003

72

x 12 data security x 4 DOS attacks
x Other
x No negative market
breaches
Empirical
reaction found for either
x 6 website outages
Studies of
Data or Function events,
x 39 viruses
Security
except when events from
x 11 website
Breaches
the months right after
defacing attacks
“9/11” are included in the
x CIA
sample
Framework
x No differences in market
reaction for Data and
Function events, or for
events occurring in
different industries
x Smaller reaction found for
larger firms

Ko and
Dorantes
(2006)

Leung and
Bose
(2008)

2007
and
Prior

2,994 x 2,994 phishing
attacks

x Other
Empirical
Studies of
Security
Breaches

x Anecdotal
Evidence

x Financial performance of
firms with Data breaches
over four consecutive
quarters was somewhat
lower than that of nonbreached firms in a
matched sample

x No negative market
reaction found, except for
a few industries (financial
but non-banking firms and
IT and telecommunication
firms)

From Table 2, four main gaps in the literature are apparent:
1. Most work has focused on Data events. Four studies that address Function events
narrowly focus on DOS attacks, and two also analyze website outages and disruptive
viruses (Campbell et al., 2003; Kannan et al., 2007). No work addresses Function
events due to such factors as hardware and software failures, although IT managers
rate those among the top threats to operational IT systems (Whitman, 2004).
2. This work provides inconclusive evidence on the impact of IT operational risk events.
Four studies of Data events find that such events result in a drop in firm market value,
and two find a similar result only for narrow contextual settings. Three of the four
studies addressing Function events observe a drop in firm market value for only
narrow contextual circumstances (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2003; Cavusoglu et al., 2004;
Kannan et al., 2007), and one finds no market reaction (Campbell et al., 2003).
3. The data sets used by the studies cover limited four to six year periods, and most
overlap with the dot-com bust and the time subsequent to the September 11, 2001
attacks (9/11), two problematic periods that may distort findings. For instance, Kannan
et al. (2007) find no market reaction to the events that they study once events from the
six months post-9/11 are excluded.
4. The studies lack theoretical foundation for the origin and nature of impact of IT
operational risk. All but two studies rest their hypotheses solely on anecdotal evidence,
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surveys of IT professionals, and past empirical studies. And only Cavusoglu et al.
(2004) rely narrowly on resource-based theory and information transfer theory to
theorize about the impact of the tested events on larger firms and security firms,
respectively.

3. Theory and Research Hypotheses
This section introduces the theoretical lens used to investigate the impact of IT operational risk and its
Data and Function subtypes. Like other studies using the event study methodology, our research
hypotheses concern the impact of IT operational risk events on the equity prices of firms experiencing
those events.

3.1. Theoretical Framework: Resource Weaknesses
Powell and Arregle (2007, p. 59) argue that “firms compete on two axes: the axis of competitive
advantage, where performance is driven by the inimitable resources and capabilities of highperforming firms; and the axis of errors, where performance is driven by failures to attend to the
activities, resources and opportunities that are equally available to all firms.” The first axis concerns
things that firms do uniquely well and lead to competitive advantage and to the generation of value.
By contrast, the second axis concerns things that firms do poorly and lead to the erosion of
competitive advantage and to the destruction of value. Others have labeled the second axis resource
weaknesses (West & DeCastro, 2001), organizational liabilities (Arend, 2004), or competitive
disadvantages (Powell, 2001).
The strategy and IT literature have paid great attention to the first axis, or to resource strengths. In
particular, the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm ascribes competitive advantage to a firm's
idiosyncratic resource strengths and capabilities used to implement firm strategies (Wernerfelt, 1984;
Barney, 1991). Such resources are strategic when they are scarce, inimitable, non-substitutable, and
appropriable. Drawing on RBV, much IT research has argued and demonstrated empirically that IT
can be a source of competitive advantage when: (a) the firm possesses IT resources that are
valuable, rare, and costly to imitate; or (b) the firm uses IT to realize the full competitive potential of
non-IT resources through complementarity and co-specialization with these resources (e.g.,
Bharadwaj, 2000; Wade & Hulland, 2004; Melville, Kraemer, & Gurbaxani, 2004; Ray, Muhanna, &
Barney, 2005; Ravinchandran & Lertwongsatien, 2005; Aral & Weill, 2007).
Much less attention has been given to the second axis, or resource weaknesses (West & DeCastro,
2001; Arend, 2004). Resource weaknesses are more than the failure of or the non-existence of
resource strengths, “but rather the failure even to satisfy the minimum success requirements …
required of any firm” (Powell, 2001, p. 877). This recognizes, consistent with RBV, that a firm
generally must also invest in resources that are neither rare nor difficult to imitate in order to maintain
competitive parity. Because resource weaknesses “destroy value in a firm rather than simply failing to
add any,” they can produce performance variations that are attributable to competitive disadvantages
(Arend, 2003, p. 280). Like strategic resource strengths, a resource weakness can be strategic if it
has three characteristics (Arend, 2004). First, it is costly – destroys value and reduces firm
performance, either directly or by intervening in the generation of value through the use of strategic
resources or by introducing the opportunity cost associated with loss of competitive position. Second,
it is scarce and inconvertible – uncommon to the entire industry and cannot be economically
converted to a benign form (West & DeCastro, 2001). Third, it is appropriated – paid for by the firm
with no economic way of avoiding its associated costs.
Based on this expanded perspective, we summarize a dynamic view of strategy development in
Figure 1 (adapted from West & DeCastro, 2001). Traditional perspectives, including that of the RBV,
tend to view strategy as being related to building distinctive competences via the development and
enhancement of unique resource strengths (path A). The expanded theoretical perspective, in
addition, recognizes that resource weaknesses and inadequacies may be developing concurrently
with strengths and competences (path B). Therefore, it posits that enhancing a competitive position
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also lies in overcoming or counteracting resource weaknesses (Path C). Moreover, firms that do not
do so will see their resource weaknesses persist and may also experience a loss of strategic
advantage as a result of erosion in (or imitation of) their resource strengths (path D). Persistence of
resource weaknesses could, in addition, constrain the ability of a firm to develop new related resource
strengths as part of strategic renewal (path E).
resource weakness
(competitive disadvantage)
Exists

Exists

C
D

E

Path A: Developing distinctive competence by
building and enhancing unique resource
strengths.

Not
exists

A
B

resource
strength
(competitive
advantage)

Not
exists

Path B: In reality, resource weaknesses may develop
concurrently with resource strengths and
competences.
Path C: Enhancing competitive position by
overcoming or counteracting existing
resource weaknesses.
Path D: Over time resource strengths and
competences erode, are imitated, or are
offset by persistent resource weaknesses
and newly-developed resource weaknesses.
Path E: Development of new competences as part of
the organization’s efforts at renewal, that is,
at reassertion or maintenance of its
competitive advantage.

Figure 1. Expanded View of (Resource-Based) Strategy Development
Our context fits well with the theory of resource weaknesses. If imperfectly implemented, the same IT
resources that endow a company with a strategic competitive advantage when they are coupled with
complementary non-IT resources could also create the risk that their own operational failure would
mean a failure of their co-dependent non-IT resources (Alter, 1999). Thus, IT resource weaknesses
could be a direct concurrent by-product of investment in the creation, support, or use of strategic IT
resource strengths (Arend, 2004). IT resource weaknesses may also arise from the natural evolution
of strategic IT resource strengths (Arend, 2004). Over time, specialized IT assets that may endow
some firms with a competitive advantage often become commoditized and readily available to all
firms and, therefore, do not offer a distinction to any firm (Clemons, 1991; Carr, 2003). Ongoing
reliance on such commoditized IT resources is a business necessity, and a failure to manage their
associated weaknesses as well as the risks that arise with continued investment in the support and
use of such resources would put a company at a competitive disadvantage. In either case, such IT
resource weaknesses are at the root of exposure to IT operational risk.

3.2. Hypotheses Formulation
When actual IT operational risk events occur, they signal to the market that IT resource weaknesses
are present within the affected firm. To investors, the presence of IT resource weaknesses signaled
by such an event is more important than the direct monetary impact of the event itself, since these
resource weaknesses are strategic and can erode the competitive position of a firm.
To begin with, IT resource weaknesses are scarce. As previously stated, they are idiosyncratic (firmspecific) because they are often the by-product of investments in scarce, idiosyncratic IT resource
strengths. And, since they cannot be separated from those resource strengths, imitable solutions to
those weaknesses do not exist in the competitive environment (West & DeCastro, 2001). The
implication is simple: when IT resource strengths erode over time, their associated weaknesses persist
and continue to expose the firm to IT operational risk (akin to a move along path D in Figure 1).
Moreover, just as it takes time to develop strategic IT resource strengths, “the dismantling of resource
weaknesses becomes an expensive and time-consuming affair” (West & DeCastro, 2001, p. 426).
This reality could limit the ability of a firm to rid itself of IT resource weaknesses as a way to enhance
its competitive position (akin to a limited ability to move along path C in Figure 1).
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IT resource weaknesses can also be costly. They may result in significant losses that are mainly
appropriated by the firm. Given firms’ increased reliance on IT resources in daily operations, IT
resource weaknesses could distract the generation of rents by the strategic IT resources embodying
them (West & DeCastro, 2001). In particular, these weaknesses could diminish (current and
previously created) IT-based competitive advantages by creating inefficiencies, or non-optimal
processes and systems, which inhibit a firm’s best potential performance with its current resource
strengths (Arend, 2004). This view is consistent with some of the empirical results of studies
summarized in Table 2.
In this light, IT resource weaknesses can place a firm at a competitive disadvantage. On the premise
that IT operational risk events signal the presence of strategic IT resource weaknesses, our first
hypothesis is:
H1: Firms that experience IT operational risk events suffer negative abnormal changes in
their market value.
Arend (2004) argues that firm performance deteriorates as the strength of a resource weakness
increases in any of its definitional traits (scarcity, costliness, and appropriation). On this basis, we posit
that Function events signal the presence of more significant IT resource weaknesses than Data events.
To clarify why, we first discuss Data events separately from Function events and then contrast the two.
IT resource weaknesses at the root of Data events are characterized by a degree of scarcity,
costliness, and appropriation. These resource weaknesses are unlikely to be scarce or unique to the
affected firm. Although the business specifics of data assets affected by Data events may vary from
firm to firm, the methods of data storage and protection are common across firms. Standardized
solutions to respective resource weaknesses exist due to extensive research and practice work on
information security (e.g., encryption and firewalls). As to the costliness of Data events, short-term
costs are mainly attributable to the recovery effort (e.g., notifying customers of private data loss and
reconstituting affected data assets). Also relevant are potential legal liability costs and regulatory
penalties, but the magnitude of such costs could be uncertain and pending at the time of the event’s
occurrence. Long-term costs are relevant for Data events involving loss of scarce confidential data
(e.g., proprietary firm data and custodial customer data). They include reputational damage, loss of
customer trust, and regulatory restrictions. In this sense, these IT resource weaknesses can
ultimately erode the ability of a firm to build, and to generate value (rents) from, strategic data assets.
IT resource weaknesses at the root of Function events have a greater degree of scarcity,
costliness, and appropriation. The functional IT assets linked to Function events are often highly
specific to the firm experiencing the events. Even if firms employ similar functional IT assets (e.g.,
SAP enterprise resource planning system), these assets are configured to fit firm-specific business
requirements, business processes, and IT architecture. Therefore, respective IT resource
weaknesses would be equally unique to an organization. This means that effective solutions to
these weaknesses would also be scarce rather than readily available. As to costliness and
appropriation, these are a function of the short-term and long-term costs of Function events. Shortterm direct costs include losses that are substantial and highly visible, in terms of lost productivity
and lost transactions (Paquette, Jaeger, & Wilson, 2010). These losses will lower the firm’s
profitability, as they will be evident on the firm’s books and records. The recovery cost from a
Function event is also substantial. For events that result in loss of availability of functional IT
assets, or Availability-type Function events, reconstituting those IT assets may be relatively quick,
but the processing of “lost” or delayed transactions must be done in parallel with ongoing business
2
operations similar to a parallel conversion approach from an old to a new IS (Dennis, Wixom, &
2
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Personal communication with Cathy Burrows, Director of Marketing Services, Royal Bank of Canada, and Scott Overby, VP of
Decision Support, Discover Card Inc. Symantec’s IT Risk Management Report from 2008 offers the following clarification (2008, p.
15): “... when they occur, availability and performance disasters can be nightmare scenarios: transaction processing at a crawl on
the busiest shopping day of the year or during a market crash, failures cascading through backup systems during a site or regional
disaster, or essential services missing when they’re needed most. Worse, Availability and Performance disasters are often
irrecoverable over the short term.”
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Tegarden, 2005). For events involving the lack of integrity of functional IT assets (e.g., faulty
processing due to a software bug), or Integrity-type Function events, recovery involves additional
challenges. Full detection and repair of root causes requires more highly skilled and slack IT staff,
solid insight into the original system design, and rapid software maintenance and testing. Since all
this is done under time and resource pressure, this could cause negative rippling effects including
new sources of IT operational risk (Charette et al., 1997). Long-term costs are more significant and
tie directly with IT resource weaknesses at the root of Function events. In a nutshell, these resource
weaknesses are challenging to overcome and will distract a firm from the generation of rents via
the strategic IT resources with which they are coupled. Specifically, these weaknesses result in
severe inefficiencies and inhibit a firm’s best potential performance with its current resources; such
inefficiencies are an important source of a resource weakness’ cost (Arend, 2004). Relative to
Integrity-type Function events, relevant resource weaknesses include inadequate IT capabilities for
the acquisition, development, deployment, accreditation, and maintenance of functional IT assets
(ITGI, 2007b). Relative to Availability-type Function events, relevant resource weaknesses include
inadequate IT capabilities for performance and capacity planning, definition of service level
agreements, and configuration and infrastructure management, among other weaknesses (ITGI,
2007b). Most importantly, such IT resource weaknesses diminish a crucial source of value
attributed to investment in IT – business growth opportunities associated with idiosyncratic IT
resource strengths (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, & Konsynski, 1999).
On balance, when compared to Data events, Function events signal the presence of more severe
IT resource weaknesses. To begin with, IT resource weaknesses at their root have greater scarcity
and cost more to resolve. And since “higher costs of conversion and transference imply that a firm
is less likely to ever rid itself of the liability [weakness]” (Arend, 2004, p. 1010), a firm is more likely
to reach a semi-permanent state of resource weakness (Wernerfelt, 1984) with respect to Functionrelated resource weaknesses. Function events are also likely to result in higher direct, reportable
costs that lower profits and weaken firm performance. Moreover, relative to long-term indirect costs,
resource weaknesses at the root of Function events erode IT-based competitive advantages more
severely than do Data events (akin to a move along path D in Figure 1), especially since they can
constrain more severely the development of new related IT competences as part of a firm’s efforts
at strategic renewal (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1995) (akin to an inability to move along path E in
Figure 1). In this light, investors would react more strongly to Function events than to Data events.
Hence, our second hypothesis is:
H2: Firms experiencing Function events suffer greater negative abnormal changes in
their market value than firms experiencing Data events.

4. Data, Analysis, and Results
This section explains the data and methodology used to test the research hypotheses and presents
the analysis results.

4.1. Data Source and Sample Selection
Our data source is a commercial operational risk events database, called Financial Institutions Risk
Scenario Trends (FIRST), marketed by Algorithmics Inc. Events in the FIRST database are
gathered from a variety of public sources such as regulatory filings (e.g., the Securities and
Exchange Commission), court resolutions, and the media (e.g., Reuters and the Wall Street
3
Journal). These events occurred globally in a variety of industries. A significant portion of the
events occurred in the financial services industry and spans 25 years from 1985 to 2009. This is
attributable to this industry being subject to greater regulatory scrutiny and more stringent reporting
requirements. FIRST’s data have been used in several empirical studies on operational risk (e.g.,
Cummins et al., 2006; Rosenberg & Schuermann, 2006). We are the first to use it in the IT context.
3

Because of the public nature of the data sources used to populate the FIRST database, it is safe to assume that information about
all events in FIRST was available to investors directly from those same sources at the time the events first became public.
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The majority of events in FIRST were reported by third parties rather than the firms that
experienced the events. This reduces the chances that our data are contaminated by self-selection
bias. However, this may also indicate some bias toward greater magnitude events, which firms
have greater difficulty hiding, an issue that we will revisit later. Nevertheless, higher magnitude
events are likely to be of prime concern to management.
FIRST offers a multi-item description of each operational risk event. Of importance to our study are:
(1) the firm where the event occurred; (2) the event date; (3) a detailed event narrative; (4) a list of
source documents for the narrative details (e.g., court filings and news articles); (5) the “event
trigger” or primary cause (People, Technology, Process, and Relationship); and (6) the event
mapping into Basel’s risk categories (see Table 1).
Other data we use include market data on daily stock prices from the University of Chicago’s CRSP
database and accounting data from the Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. All the variables
we use are measured in U.S. dollars and adjusted for inflation to January 2010 using the Consumer
Price Index. These variables are listed and defined in Table 7, Section 4.3.
Table 3 details the process we used to construct the data sample. We determined the event date,
denoted as “day 0” hereafter, to be the first press-cutting date on which an event was announced to
the media. We cross-checked these dates against the Dow Jones Factiva and the LexisNexis
business news databases. We excluded events potentially contaminated by confounding events,
such as earnings announcements, new CEO appointments, mergers and acquisitions, and major
lawsuits. To ensure robustness of the results, following Kannan et al. (2007), we also excluded
events that occurred in the six months after 9/11 and all events following the August 2008 financial
market meltdown. The final sample contains 142 events.
Table 3. Data Sample Construction Methodology
Phase 1: Identify
source database

x FIRST database containing 9,005 publicly reported operational risk events as of January,
2010.

Phase 2: Narrow
x Excluded events from U.S. private firms and non-financial firms and events occurring in foreign
events to U.S. publicly firms.
traded firms
x Kept events that occurred in publicly traded U.S. companies – 2,508 events.

x Identified events that may have occurred due to IT operational risk – 1,120 events:

Phase 3: Identify
initial data sample

o Selected events having “Technology” and “Processes” as their Event Trigger;
o Selected events whose narrative contains one or more of the following keywords: “data,”
“computer,” “electronic,” “information,” “system,” “technology/technical,” “security,”
“software,” “hack,” “phishing,” “access,” “code,” “password,” “data,” “network,” “transaction,”
“error/erroneous,” “hard drive,” “outage,” “volume,” “internet,” “interrupt,” “breach,” “cyber,”
“virus,” “attack,” “glitch,” “steal/stole,” “confidential,” “process,” “e-mail,” “private
account/information/record,” and “privacy”.
x All pre-selected events were then independently checked by the three authors, who reviewed
the detailed narratives provided for each event in order to identify IT operational risk events –
195 events.

x Excluded 28 events involving confounding factors that occurred within a week from the event
date:
o Searched for firm-specific news in the Dow Jones Factiva database and the LexisNexis
database of business news articles.
o Eliminated events that occurred around the time of earnings announcements, CEO
appointments, mergers and acquisitions, tender offers, and other major news releases.
Phase 4: Produce the
o Removed IT operational risk events that occurred within the same firm and had overlapping
final data sample
event windows.
x Excluded 20 events that occurred during the 6 months after 9/11 (7 events) and after August
2008 (13 events), when the financial meltdown began.
x Excluded 5 events for which market data was unavailable.
x A total of 142 events were retained.
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All three authors independently classified the 142 events in the sample. Each event was classified as
either a Data or a Function event. Of the 142 events, 67 are Data events and 75 are Function events.
We further categorized the Function events into the Integrity and Availability subcategories: 52
compromised the integrity of functional IT assets and 23 compromised the availability of such assets.
Both classifications achieved inter-rater reliability levels close to 1.0.
We further classified our events by sub-industry using U.S. Standard Industry Classification (SIC)
codes. Almost 80 percent of the events occurred within firms classified as Depository Institutions (2digit SIC code of 60) and firms classified as Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges,
and Services (2-digit SIC code of 62). Depository Institutions made up 44 percent of the sample (29
Data and 34 Function events), and Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, and
Services made up 35 percent (18 Data and 32 Function events). The remainder of our events
occurred within firms that fell into other financial sub-industries.
Our analysis of how each of the events map into Basel’s categories of operational risk suggests that
Function events are as prevalent as Data events. Data and Function events in our sample are
similarly distributed across all seven categories (see Table 4). There are slightly more Function events
in the two categories most visibly linked to IT operational risk, namely the Business Disruption and
System Failure and the Execution, Delivery, and Process Management categories (27 and 21 versus
20 and 17, respectively). We note that about 40 percent of all events in our sample actually fall into
the remaining five categories, with the bulk (25.4 percent) falling into the External Fraud category.
Table 4 also parallels our earlier discussion of Table 1.
Table 4. Breakdown of IT Operational Risk Events by Basel II Event Type Category
Basel II Event Type Category
Internal Fraud
External Fraud
Employment Practices and Workplace Safety
Clients, Products, and Business Practices
Damage to Physical Assets
Business Disruption and System Failure
Execution, Delivery, and Process Management
Total:

Distribution of Sample ITOR Events: Number (Proportion)
All Events

Data

Function

6 (4.2%)
36 (25.4%)
3 (2.1%)
11 (7.7%)
1 (0.7%)
47 (33.1%)
38 (26.8%)
142 (100%)

3
19
3
5
0
20
17
67

3
17
0
6
1
27
21
75

Figure 2 illustrates the time series of the Data and Function events in our sample. It shows a
generally increasing trend of the total number of events over time; the low number of events around
2001 and 2008 is partly attributable to our sample selection (see Table 3, Phase 4). Moreover, both
event types are relatively evenly distributed in each year. Hence, there is no evidence that either
type of event has greater prevalence over the other in any particular period or in general.
We also inspected the (measurable) loss amounts recorded in FIRST for Data and Function events,
since they may inform about differences in the magnitude of events as a potential source of bias in
the market reaction to different events. The data on loss amounts was available only for 59 (or 42
percent of the 142) events in our sample, and we present their descriptive statistics in Table 5.
Compared to Data events, all statistics are greater for Function events, suggesting that loss
magnitudes of Function events may be higher. However, the null hypothesis of the population means
of losses being equal could not be rejected (p-value=0.1015), probably because of the small
subsample with available loss data. In any case, we are not able to control for the event magnitude in
our econometric models due to limited availability of loss data in our sample. This is not a problem,
however. Consistent with our theory, from a value perspective, the point is not the size of an event as
much as the fact that the event signals the presence of deeper resource weaknesses. With this said,
one still cannot dismiss the possibility that loss size plays a role in Data events being more frequently
disclosed to the public than Function events, and, thus, that our results may be biased in this sense.
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Figure 2. Time Series of Data and Function Operational Risk Events
Table 5. Loss Descriptive Statistics by Event Type
Mean

Median

25 perc

75 perc

N

t-test for ȝ D – ȝ F :
t-stat [p-value]

Data

4.56

0.62

0.05

3.08

18

-1.6645

Function

28.09

4.55

0.30

12.87

41

[0.1015]

20.91

1.89

0.23

11.48

59

Total:

All dollar amounts are in USD millions.

4.2. Event Study Analysis and Univariate Results
We use the event study methodology to test whether the market value of a firm is sensitive to IT
operational risk event announcements. This methodology postulates that the market takes into
account all available information in determining security prices (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Hence,
when an unexpected event that brings new information is announced, if such event is value relevant,
the market reaction to the event will be observed over an event window [T1,T2] that overlaps with the
event’s first press-cutting date. Where the event date is denoted day 0, following convention, we tried
various event windows starting three days before day 0 (T1=
í WRDFFRXQWIR r a possible leakage of
information prior to the announcement, and extending up to three days after day 0 (T2=3) to give
stock prices time to adjust to the event.
We estimate the market reaction to an event using two steps. The first step estimates normal stock
returns. Expected returns for a firm i at date t are estimated through the single index market model:
  R

it

ai  bi Rmt  eit

(1)

where R it is firm i’s return on the common stock on day t, and R mt is the return on a market index on day
t. Following many financial studies, R mt in our study is the equal-weighted return index from the CRSP
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database estimated over 255 trading days prior to the announcement date, during [-301, -46]. The
second step computes the daily abnormal returns (AR) during the event window for firm i on day t:

   AR

it

Rit  (aˆi  bˆi Rmt )

(2)

  
where   â and b̂ are the OLS estimates from the market model. Abnormal returns are then accumulat
ed for each event window to form cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).

For our study, the a priori expectation is that IT operational risk event announcements would
generate negative abnormal returns. Hence,
where CARs are averaged across all firm-events to
______
  ______
CAR
[
T
,
T
produce the mean CARs, denoted as
1 2 ] , the null hypothesis is: CAR [T1 ,T2 ] t 0 . We test this
hypothesis using a one-tail test of Patell’s (1976) standardized Z-statistic (Brown & Warner, 1985).
Table 6 shows mean CARs for the event groups and univariate tests of our hypotheses. The results
support H1 and H2. Based on column (1), H1 is supported. In general, the market value of firms
experiencing an event drops, on average, by 0.26 percent on day 0, and it continues to drop up to
day 2. Moreover, the mean CARs range between -0.52 percent and -0.82 percent, depending on
the event window, and most are statistically significant at the 1 percent to 5 percent level. The
remaining columns lend strong support for H2. In column (3), mean CARs for Function events are
substantially negative and statistically significant near or below the 1 percent level for all event
windows; the maximum mean CAR is -1.48 percent for event window [-1, 2]. By contrast, mean
CARs for Data events are smaller and not significant for all event windows. Based on column (6),
the univariate test of the difference between the mean CARs for Function and Data events formally
confirms H2. Compared to Data events, mean CARs for Function events are up to an additional
1.54 percent lower. These results are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, Function
events have a more adverse market reaction than Data events. Finally, columns (4)-(5) and (7)-(8)
show the comparable results for the Integrity and Availability types of Function events. Based on
columns (4) and (5), each subcategory on its own shows similar results to those for all Function
events, except that the mean ARs and CARs are notably smaller for Availability-type events. As
such, column (7) shows that mean CARs for Data events are not significantly different than for
Integrity-type Function events, for the most part, whereas column (8) shows them to be significantly
higher than for Availability-type Function events.

4.3. Multivariate Hypothesis Testing
We estimate regression models that further test H2 and help explain some of the variation in the
market reaction to IT operational risk events. The variables are described in Table 7. The
dependent variable is CAR[-1,2] because the [-1,2] event window has the largest negative mean
CARs for most event groups (Table 6). The independent variables are dummy variables denoting
the type of event.
We also included four control variables in the model. First is firm size (measured by the natural
logarithm of total liabilities). It has been found to influence the market reaction to IT operational risk
events in other studies (Acquisti et al., 2006; Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Kannan et al., 2007). Second is
firm growth (measured by the Tobin’s q ratio). Studies have shown that high growth firms are more
negatively affected by operational risk events than those with fewer growth opportunities, “consistent
with the view that such firms may have to forego attractive projects following an operational loss event”
(Cummins et al., 2006, p. 2,631). The last two control variables account for possible industry effects.
Earlier studies (Acquisti et al., 2006; Leung & Bose, 2008) have noted that industry differences can
affect the market reaction to certain IT operational risk events. We add two dummy variables to control
for the firms with a 2-digit SIC code of 60 (depository institutions) and 62 (security and commodity
brokers, dealers, exchanges, and services) that constitute the majority of our sample. Table 7
summarizes the definitions and constructions of the variables used in this study.
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0.14
(1.460)
[0.928]

0.11
(1.557)
[0.940]

0.07
(0.076)
[0.530]

-0.26
(-1.366)
[0.086]*

-0.32
(-1.969)
[0.025]**

-0.24
(-1.066)
[0.143]

0.13
(0.668)
[0.748]

-0.52
(-1.882)
[0.030]**

-0.75
(-2.163)
[0.015]**

-0.63
(-1.636)
[0.051]*

-0.58
(-2.358)
[0.009]***
-0.82
(-2.541)
[0.006]***

-0.69
(-1.867)
[0.031]**

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

[-1, 1]

[-1, 2]

[-1, 3]

[0, 1]

[0, 3]
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50

55

57

49

53

56

46

57

55

53

54

49

49

%
(<0)

-0.08
(-0.554)
[0.290]

-0.05
(-0.274)
[0.392]
-0.20
(-0.506)
[0.307]

0.18
(-0.268)
[0.394]

0.06
(-0.184)
[0.427]

0.21
(0.069)
[0.528]

0.12
(-0.231)
[0.409]

-0.15
(-0.488)
[0.313]

-0.17
(-0.514)
[0.304]

0.12
(0.126)
[0.550]

0.26
(0.507)
[0.694]

0.25
(1.865)
[0.969]

0.04
(0.370)
[0.644]

Mean CAR (%)
(z-statistic)
[p-value]

Data (D)
(N=67)

(2)

49

52

52

42

45

49

51

52

54

48

49

49

51

%
(<0)

-1.24
(-2.046)
[0.020]**

-1.07
(-2.986)
[0.001]***
-1.37
(-3.019)
[0.001]***

-1.35
(-1.998)
[0.023]**

-1.48
(-2.802)
[0.003]***

-1.18
(-2.655)
[0.004]***

0.13
(1.137)
[0.872]

-0.31
(-1.005)
[0.157]

-0.46
(-2.223)
[0.013]**

-0.61
(-2.000)
[0.023]**

-0.11
(-0.375)
[0.354]

-0.02
(0.379)
[0.648]

0.23
(1.660)
[0.952]

Mean CAR (%)
(z-statistic)
[p-value]

Function (F)
(N=75)

(3)

51

57

61

55

60

61

43

61

56

57

57

49

47

%
(<0)

-0.61
(-1.017)
[0.155]

-0.80
(-2.259)
[0.012]**
-0.90
(-2.260)
[0.012]**

-0.78
(-1.206)
[0.114]

-1.06
(-2.289)
[0.011]**

-0.97
(-2.227)
[0.013]**

0.29
(1.881)
[0.970]

-0.10
(-0.720)
[0.236]

-0.48
(-1.728)
[0.042]**

-0.32
(-1.467)
[0.071]*

-0.17
(-0.663)
[0.254]

0.06
(0.087)
[0.535]

-0.11
(0.521)
[0.699]

Integrity (I)
(N=52)
Mean CAR (%)
(z-statistic)
[p-value]

(4)

48

56

58

54

58

60

38

60

52

58

62

46

48

%
(<0)

(5)

-2.67
(-2.165)
[0.015]**

-1.66
(-1.996)
[0.023]**
-2.45
(-2.053)
[0.020]**

-2.65
(-1.794)
[0.036]**

-2.43
(-1.618)
[0.053]*

-1.65
(-1.445)
[0.074]*

-0.22
(-0.775)
[0.219]

-0.79
(-0.733)
[0.232]

-0.42
(-1.417)
[0.078]*

-1.25
(-1.406)
[0.080]*

0.02
(0.320)
[0.626]

-0.20
(0.554)
[0.710]

1.01
(2.214)
[0.987]

57

61

70

57

65

65

52

65

65

57

48

57

43

Availability (A)
(N=23)
Mean CAR (%)
%
(z-statistic)
(<0)
[p-value]

Hypothesis: H2

-1.16
(-1.496)
[0.069]*

-1.02
(-1.767)
[0.040]**
-1.17
(-1.703)
[0.045]**

-1.53
(-1.760)
[0.040]**

-1.54
(-1.999)
[0.024]**

-1.39
(-2.227)
[0.014]**

0.01
(-0.042)
[0.517]

-0.16
(-0.426)
[0.336]

-0.29
(-0.674)
[0.251]

-0.73
(-1.991)
[0.024]**

-0.37
(-1.040)
[0.150]

-0.27
(-0.738)
[0.231]

0.19
(0.482)
[0.685]

Mean CAR diff.
(t-statistic)
[p-value]

ȝF± ȝD)

(6)

-0.53
(-0.623)
[0.267]

-0.75
(-1.168)
[0.123]
-0.70
(-0.947)
[0.173]

-0.96
(-1.041)
[0.150]

-1.12
(-1.448)
[0.075]*

-1.18
(-1.761)
[0.040]**

0.17
(0.467)
[0.679]

0.05
(0.166)
[0.566]

-0.31
(-0.637)
[0.263]

-0.44
(-1.159)
[0.124]

-0.43
(-1.218)
[0.113]

-0.19
(-0.488)
[0.313]

-0.15
(-0.343)
[0.366]

Mean CAR diff.
(t-statistic)
[p-value]

ȝI± ȝD)

(7)

-2.59
(-2.782)
[0.003]***

-1.61
(-2.830)
[0.003]***
-2.25
(-2.874)
[0.003]***

-2.83
(-2.507)
[0.007]***

-2.49
(-2.506)
[0.007]***

-1.86
(-2.585)
[0.006]***

-0.34
(-0.843)
[0.201]

-0.64
(-1.235)
[0.110]

-0.25
(-0.619)
[0.269]

-1.37
(-2.940)
[0.002]***

-0.24
(-0.418)
[0.339]

-0.45
(-0.815)
[0.209]

0.97
(1.720)
[0.956]

Mean CAR diff.
(t-statistic)
[p-value]

ȝA± ȝD)

(8)

CARs are market model-adjusted abnormal returns (measured in percentages), defined from an industry market model estimated over 255 trading days prior to day 0, during [-301, -46]. The industry index is
constructed from a portfolio of equal-weighted equity returnV&ROXPQVODEHOHG³  ´LQGLFDWHWKHSURSRUWLRQRIHYHQWVZLWKDQHJDWLYHPHDQ$5 or &$53DWHOO¶Vz-test statistics in columns (1)-(5) are in round
brackets. p-values(in square brackets) are based on a left-tailed test. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

[0, 2]

Mean CAR (%)
(z-statistic)
[p-value]

Day /
Event Window

All ITORs
(N=142)

Hypothesis: H1

(1)

Table 6: Mean ARs and CARs for IT Operational Risk Event Groups
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Table 7. Model Variables and their Definitions
Variable Name
Dependent
Variable

Definition and Calculation

Source

CAR[-1,2]

Cumulative abnormal return over the [-1, 2] event window, Event study model;
measured in percentages
market data from CRSP

D_Function

Dummy variable equal to one if an event is of Function
type

Event description

Independent
D_Integrity
Variables

Dummy variable equal to one if an event is of Integrity
type

Event description

Dummy variable equal to one if an event is of Availability
type

Event description

D_Availability

FirmSize

Control
Variables

FirmGrowth

D_SIC60,
D_SIC62

Ln(total liabilities), where total liabilities are measured in Compustat
USD billions; firm size was found to influence the reaction
to IT operational risk events (Acquisti et al., 2006;
Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Kannan et al., 2007).
Tobin’s q ratio: (market value of equity plus book value of Compustat
debt)/ (total assets), both measured in decimal; growth
firms may suffer greater losses, as has been seen for
general operational risk events (Cummins et al. 2006).
Dummy variable equal to one if the 2-digit SIC code is 60 Compustat
or 62, respectively; the effect of industry differences have
been observed by two studies (Acquisti et al., 2006;
Leung and Bose, 2008).

All dollar values are adjusted for inflation to January 2010 using the Consumer Price Index. Data for the index was obtained
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED database.

The Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix is shown in Table 8. CAR[-1,2] is strongly and negatively
correlated with FirmGrowth. A high correlation also exists between FirmSize and FirmGrowth, as high
growth firms tend to be smaller (Cabral 1995; Lang, Ofek, & Stultz, 1996). Further, these two variables
are functionally related; the measure of FirmSize, total liabilities, is highly correlated with one of the
inputs to the measure of FirmGrowth, total assets, since financial services firms typically have high
leverage ratios (e.g., Mansfield, 1962). Finally, high correlations also exist, by definition, between
dummy variables.
Table 8. Pearson Correlation Matrix
CAR [-1,2] D_Function

-0.1666

D_Function

D_Availability

D_SIC60
D_SIC62

FirmSize

FirmGrowth

D_SIC60

D_SIC62

1

[0.048]**

D_Integrity

FirmGrowth

D_Availability

1

CAR[-1,2]

FirmSize

D_Integrity

-0.0507

0.7184

[0.549]

[0.000]***

1

-0.1594

0.4155

-0.3342

[0.058]*

[0.000]***

[0.000]***

0.0941

0.0789

0.1294

-0.0623

[0.266]

[0.351]

[0.125]

[0.461]

1
1

-0.3962

0.0298

-0.0230

0.0704

-0.5505

[0.000]***

[0.725]

[0.786]

[0.405]

[0.000]***

0.0458

0.0206

-0.0609

0.1076

0.2235

-0.2605

[0.588]

[0.808]

[0.471]

[0.203]

[0.008]***

[0.002]***

-0.0510

0.1386

0.0749

0.0899

-0.2010

0.0934

-0.6381

[0.547]

[0.100]*

[0.376]

[0.287]

[0.017]**

[0.269]

[0.000]***

1
1
1

Pair-wise correlation coefficient estimates and p-values for model variables. Superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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We use three regression model specifications. Model 0 contains only control variables. Model 1 adds a
dichotomous variable D_Function to capture the difference in market reaction to Function events and
Data events. Model 2 replaces D_Function with D_Integrity and D_Availability, to capture the difference
in market reaction to the two subcategories of Function events compared to Data events. We estimate
the three models using a cross-section ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The distribution of the
dependent variable shows no significant deviations from the normality assumption, and the Chow test
(Chow, 1960) of the coefficients of the control variables being different across the Function and Data
subsamples is negative. Hence, a pooled regression is well justified.
We present the regression results in Table 9. A negative coefficient associated with an explanatory
variable means a greater negative market reaction for higher values of that variable. Model 1
supports H2, confirming our earlier univariate test results. The coefficient of D_Function is negative
and statistically significant (p=0.0278), indicating that the market value of firms experiencing a
Function event drops, on average, an additional 1.1577 percent compared to a Data event. Model 2
similarly shows the coefficients of both D_Integrity and D_Availability to be negative, with the
former having a weak statistical significance level (p=0.0979) and the latter a strong statistical
significant level (p=0.0386). Compared to Data events, the market value of firms experiencing an
Integrity-type or Availability-type Function event drops, on average, an additional 0.8596 percent
and 1.8906 percent, respectively. In all three models, the variance inflation factors (VIF) for our
variables ranged from 1.05 to 1.83, well below the VIF value of 10 commonly used as a minimum
threshold for multicollinearity to be a concern.
Table 9. Determinants of CARs – Regression Results
Predicted
Sign

Model 0

Model 1

Model 2

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

Coefficient (t-statistic)

D_Function

(–)

D_Integrity

(–)

-0.8596 (-1.30)*

D_Availability

(–)

-1.8906 (-1.78)**

-1.1577 (-1.93)**

Control Variables:
FirmSize

(+)

-0.4194 (-2.86)***

-0.3708 (-2.69)***

-0.3852 (-2.74)***

FirmGrowth

()

-3.8247 (-3.56)***

-3.6844 (-3.56)***

-3.6470 (-3.48)***

D_SIC60

(+/–)

-1.1546 (-1.67)**

-0.9131 (-1.42)*

-0.7296 (-1.15)

D_SIC62

(+/–)

-1.1686 (-1.01)

-0.8118 (-0.73)

-0.6777 (-0.65)

Intercept
Number of Observations
F-statistic [p-value]
2

R

2

ǻ5

7.0617 (3.65)***

7.0264 (3.83)***

6.9340 (3.68)***

142

142

142

4.88 [0.0020]***

5.22 [0.0006]***

3.86 [0.0029]***

0.1893

0.2039

0.2092

n/a

+0.0146

+0.0199

The t-statistics (in round brackets) are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by firm. Superscripts ***,
**, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Significance levels are based on a one-tailed test,
GHSHQGLQJRQWKHVLJQǻ52 is defined as R2 – R2 0 , where the subscript “0” refers to Model 0.

A comparison of Models 0, 1, and 2 suggests that the control variables explain more of the variation
in the market reaction to IT operational risk events than the independent variables. The regression
coefficients for FirmSize and FirmGrowth are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent
level in all three models. However, the high R-squared of 0.1893 in Model 0 is largely attributable to
the FirmGrowth variable. (In fact, if FirmGrowth is removed from Model 0, the R-squared reduces to
merely 0.0100.) The coefficient of FirmGrowth indicates that the market reaction is more punitive to
higher growth firms. Likewise, the market reacts more negatively to events in larger firms,
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suggesting that after accounting for growth and industry, the market is more surprised to see an IT
operational risk event in firms with more well-established and diverse business operations. Finally,
of the industry dummies, only the first one (2-digit SIC code of 60) is mildly significant, indicating
that the market reaction is slightly more pronounced for depository institutions than for other
financial firms, likely because the market is more surprised to see events in more regulated firms.

5. Discussion and Future Research
This section discusses our main results and contributions, limitations of our study, and the
implications for research and practice. It also outlines directions for future research.

5.1. Contributions and Main Findings
This paper is the first to present the framework of resource weaknesses as a theoretical lens for
conceptualizing IT operational risk and examining its impact on firm performance. This framework
supplements another theory that has been used extensively in IT research, the RBV of the firm.
More importantly, our empirical results indicate that the predictions of this theoretical framework
correspond well with reality.
Some of our empirical findings are the first of their kind and offer novel insights into the wealth
effect of IT operational risk. Specifically, in examining the impact of IT operational risk events on
public U.S. financial services firms, we find that firms experiencing these events suffer a
(statistically) significant negative drop in their market value when such events are first announced.
This result is consistent with earlier studies on operational risk, in general (Perry & de
Fontnouvelle, 2005; Cummins et al., 2006; Gillet, Hübner, & Plunus, 2010). The more important
insights, however, pertain to the impact of the Data and Function subtypes of IT operational risk.
We find that firms experiencing Function events suffer, on average, a 1.48 percent drop in their
market value, compared with a 0.75 percent drop for IT operational risk events, in general.
Moreover, only Function events have a (statistically) significant wealth effect, and this wealth effect
is substantially more negative than that of Data events. On average, Function events result in an
additional market value drop of 1.157 percent compared with Data events. Of the Function events,
those that specifically impair the availability rather than integrity of functional IT assets result in an
additional drop in value of 1.89 percent compared with Data events. These results provide ample
motivation for researchers and practitioners to revisit and test any existing perceptions that
Function-related IT operational risk is any less detrimental than Data-related risk.
For the most part, our results contrast with those of past studies (see Table 2). Contrary to our
results, past studies either observed no significant market reaction to Function events (Campbell et
al., 2003) or observed a market reaction only under narrow circumstances (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2003;
Kannan et al., 2007). Likewise, contrary to our result, the majority of past studies found varying
degrees of market reaction to Data events (Campbell et al., 2003; Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Acquisti
et al., 2006; Leung & Bose, 2008). A key reason for this divergence in results may be that our data
sample also contains types of Data and Function events not considered in past studies, namely,
events that are accidental in nature and originate within the firm. Additionally, our sample is
restricted to events in the financial services industry, while other studies pooled events from a wide
range of industries. Future research that accounts for these differences may help reconcile our
resulting differences with past studies.
Our results also show some firm-specific characteristics to be more important predictors of the
degree of negative wealth effect of IT operational risk events than the types of events themselves.
The negative market reaction tends to be the greatest for high growth firms. Moreover, for any two
firms with identical growth potential, and holding all else constant, the larger firm is expected to
experience a more negative wealth effect. Last, having focused on the financial services industry,
we find the negative wealth effect to be slightly stronger for depository institutions than for other
institution types.
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5.2. Limitations
All this said, we recognize that our study is subject to limitations. To begin with, our results may be
limited to public U.S. financial services firms. Although the financial services industry is sufficiently large
in its own right for our results to be of value to a wide audience, generalizing our results is important. It is
necessary to analyze IT operational risk data that are much broader in nature while controlling for
industry- and country-specific factors such as the regulatory and macroeconomic environment. In any
event, it is important to keep in mind two things. First, our findings about Data events are likely to extend
to other prominent industries facing equally strong regulatory restrictions on data security (e.g., the
medical industry and patient privacy under HIPPA). Second, the financial services industry is a good
representative of IT-intensive industries, and so, Function events may be equally detrimental in those
other industries.
Another potential limitation is that the two categories of IT operational risk events we analyzed are
broad. This choice was motivated by a desire to shed light on the category of events least studied to
date. Future research should also examine more granular event subcategories. In particular, since past
research has concentrated on Data events that are malicious in nature and arise from external sources
(see Table 2), future research ought to be sensitive to the intent of events (malicious vs. accidental) and
to their source (internal vs. external). Understanding differences between more granular subtypes of IT
operational risk events could help firms better manage their efforts to identify, assess, and manage
different subtypes of this risk. Another useful distinction could be the firm’s IT sourcing mode. For
example, vendor-supplied software is one of the most common reasons for trading system outages in
financial institutions (Chorafas, 2004). Examination of this aspect alone may have important implications
for IT outsourcing decisions, on how vendors are selected, and on contracting practices.
Third, as we indicated earlier (in Section 4.1), we could not control for the size or magnitude of events in
our data sample. Not only is it possible that our results are sensitive to the size of events, but another
potential consequence is that our results may be biased toward larger Function events. Since there are
laws that mandate disclosure of Data breaches but no laws that mandate disclosure of Function events,
it could be that only higher-magnitude Function events make their way to the public eye. If so, the
occurrence of Function events and the significance of their ensuing impact may be more surprising to
investors. Hence, a potential bias could exist between the two risk types concerning the impact of
publicly disclosed IT operational risk events. However, even if this bias does indeed exist, it does not
change our conclusion that Function events, on average, result in a greater negative wealth effect.
Rather, it may mean that Function events are more damaging not because they are the result of
intrinsically stronger IT resource weaknesses but rather because they are likely to be brought to light
only when they are sufficiently significant. Regardless, the overall message of this research remains
valid: Function-related IT operational risk should receive more attention from both research and practice
than it has in the past.

5.3. Implications for Research and Practice
Our findings have implications for IT practice and research. For practice, the implications are
straightforward – IT operational risk is a major hazard that cannot be ignored. Firms must make the
necessary efforts to understand, identify, and manage this risk. Firms must also examine their exposure to
specific subtypes of this risk and determine which subtypes deserve more attention. And, perhaps most
importantly, the average firm ought to view Function-related risk at least as seriously as Data-related risk.
More broadly, firms must examine IT operational risk and its implications from a resource weakness
perspective. Despite their high cost, the generation of IT resource weaknesses is often overlooked by firms
in the pursuit of strategic advantage. As IT resource weaknesses arise over time in conjunction with IT
resource strengths, they may not be evident (West & DeCastro, 2001). If a firm has difficulty detecting its IT
resource weaknesses, these weaknesses will eventually manifest as IT operational risk events, which
inform the world of the presence of the weaknesses and the firm’s inability to properly manage them.
One broad implication for research stems from the fact that our paper and its results highlight how little we
know about IT operational risk. A crucial need exists to develop approaches and methods for understanding
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and managing different types of this risk. These approaches and methods must incorporate IT operational
risk considerations into areas fertile for future research. We summarize below three main areas.
First and foremost, the resource weaknesses theoretical lens that we have presented is the first attempt
(known to us) that seeks to close a serious theoretical gap in the literature. This theory supplements the
resource-based theory of the firm, which has been used extensively in IT research. As such, it may offer
another powerful way to theorize about IT resources and their associated operational risk. Nevertheless,
it remains to be seen if this theory is sufficiently developed to enable the investigation of aspects of IT
operational risk not considered in this study, such as the intent of risk events (malicious vs. accidental)
and their initiation source (external vs. internal).
Moreover, this theory offers broader propositions that deserve an examination and empirical evaluation
in the IT context. For example, the theory recognizes that investments for building resource strengths
and dismantling resource weaknesses are ultimately undertaken in order to improve the
competitiveness of a firm, but an open question remains about which of these investments is more
effective (West & DeCastro, 2001). Likewise, on the premise that “efforts to reduce stocks of resource
weaknesses will take more time and greater investment than will efforts made to build stocks of
resource strengths,” and because the effectiveness of investments made to reduce stocks of resource
weaknesses may be more difficult to assess, the theory postulates that firms often prefer taking the
route of building and maintaining competitive advantage through investments in multiple resource
strengths (West & DeCastro, 2001, p. 434). If this assertion is accurate, the consequences of IT
operational risk should be clear. “By concentrating only on the development of strengths, firms could
actually lay a foundation for losing advantage due to inattention to emerging weaknesses and
inadequacies” (West & DeCastro, 2001, p. 419). Put another way, by acting in this manner, firms divert
management attention and discretionary investments away from dismantling IT resource weaknesses,
resulting in a diminished strategic position. All this leads to a fundamental IT management question: Is
there an optimal balance between investment in creating stocks of IT resource strengths and investment
in reducing stocks of IT resource weaknesses? Any attempt to address such a question would go to the
heart of the problem of managing IT operational risk.
A related and more practical area is IT system development and maintenance. System design decisions
4
that are better informed about the impact of IT operational risk can reduce exposure to this risk. For
example, better system design can simplify and improve IT system maintenance, which itself is a source
of IT operational risk (Charette et al., 1997; Chorafas, 2004). Another key issue is the design of IT
controls, which can be built into the technology itself or into the IT-supported business work environment
(Juergens, Maberry, Ringle, & Fisher, 2006). For Function-related risk, examples include IT controls for
business continuity, disaster recovery, and prevention of user input errors. For Data-related risk,
examples include IT controls for handling and disseminating data, segregating duties, and manually
reconciling system output. A third issue is how investments in IS development and IS maintenance are
evaluated and budgeted for. In particular, it may be necessary to take into account how such IT
investments are expected to affect the organization’s overall operational risk exposure. A primary
challenge is to measure this exposure from a long-term perspective and balance it against short-term IT
investment goals and constraints.
Another related area that lies at the intersection of both earlier areas is the examination of IT resource
weaknesses in terms of the root causes of IT operational risk events. Detailed narrative descriptions of
IT operational risk events may reveal the risk factors associated with different subtypes of these events
(Keil, Cule, Lyytinen, & Schmidt, 1998). These risk factors can then be tested against the severity of
events and their subtypes. The results may highlight specific factors that contribute most crucially to the
4

Chorafas (2004, pp. 95-96) offers a highly illustrative example: “In classical ‘electronic data processing’ (EDP), the same
information element is entered up to seven times. The average number of re-entries used to be 3.5. Now the average is 2.8. This is
still too high, let alone the error in transcription which comes into the IT system through multiple entries made in incompatible formats
and addressing heterogeneous files […]. No wonder that data entry costs and subsequent clearance of embedded errors have been
consuming 20-25% of the IT budget in many companies. The best policy is one entry, many uses, but its implementation demands a
deal of organization and self-discipline. Both are lacking from the majority of IT operations in the banking industry, with the result that
operational risks are ballooning.”
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presence of IT resource weaknesses and exposure to IT operational risk. This may also bring us closer
to the ability to balance trade-offs between long-term exposure to IT operational risk and short-term IT
investment goals and constraints.
The strong relevance of these research venues to the effective management and use of IT resources
highlights the need to expand the relatively limited extant research on IT operational risk. We are
confident that the theoretical basis we have presented and our findings on the economic significance of
some types of IT operational risk will motivate researchers to follow up on our present work and pursue
these research venues.

6. Conclusion
As IT systems are increasingly embedded in the business process environments that they support,
failures of these systems can lead to significant consequences for organizations. Despite this, there
are significant gaps in the research concerning IT operational risk. To explore these gaps, we
define two broad categories of IT operational risk for the purposes of this paper, which are based
on the types of assets comprising IT systems. Data-related IT operational risk is any threat to the
confidentiality of data assets that can result in the disclosure, misuse, or destruction of these
assets. Function-related IT operational risk is any threat to the availability or to the integrity of
functional IT assets (that may eventually affect data assets). Extant research has primarily focused
on Data events, while little analysis exists concerning Function events. Additionally, we apply the
organizational liability framework, which is an extension of the resource-based value theory, to the
concept of IT operational risk.
We examine the economic impact of these two categories and of IT operational risk, in general, by
using the event study methodology. The data we use consists of a balanced mixture of publicly
reported operational risk events in the two categories of interest. Our results show that IT
operational risk events are value relevant in the sense that they impose a strong negative impact
on the market values of organizations that experience such events. More importantly, these results
are largely driven by Function events, as Data events do not result in a significant effect on firms’
market value. We control our analysis for certain firm characteristics and find that some are
important predictors of the market reaction to IT operational risk events. Our findings indicate that
IT operational risk and, especially, Function-related risk are areas of IT risk that warrant close
attention from researchers and practitioners. They may also indicate the need for research and
practice to, perhaps, guard against the over-emphasis of Data-related risk at the expense of
Function-related risk.
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